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Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870.
The main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests that
extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have
reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly
incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity
to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been
closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial
openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are
traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the
willingness to go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. But the same
factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and so its frequency. We
need better understanding of how to promote these goods without incurring
adverse side-effects on world peace.
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The Frequency of Wars
“War made the state and states made war” (Tilly 1975, p. 42).
Wars are becoming more frequent. More precisely, the frequency of bilateral
militarized conflicts among independent states has been rising steadily over 130
years. In this paper we consider how to evaluate this as a fact, how to explain it, and
how to respond to it.
Part 1 of the paper reviews the data, and finds cause for concern. Part 2 outlines
some reasons for puzzlement. The puzzle is that the world has become more
globalized and more democratic; on both counts it should have got more peaceful,
not less. We show that the answer to the puzzle will be related to the changing
number of states. In Part 3, we discuss various aspects of the relationship between
war and state formation. In part 4, we raise some issues about how the factors
conducive to peace and war have been analyzed in the recent literature and suggest
lines of further investigation, in particular underlying determinants of state capacity
for war. Fiscal and commercial aspects of the capacity for war are discussed in Parts
5 and 6; the issue here is that these capacities are promoted by the same forces of
democratization and globalization that are supposed to discourage conflict. Part 7
concludes.
1. How Frequent?
Many indicators of interstate conflict have been flat or declining for decades. This
includes the number of wars in each year since 1826 (Kristian Gleditsch 2004, p.
243), the number of military fatalities in each year since 1946 (Joseph 2008, p. 114),
and the annual probability of bilateral interstate conflict, which was trending
upwards between 1870 and 1914, has been in decline since 1950 (Martin, Mayer
and Thoenig 2008, p. 866). In the most recent years, despite conflicts associated
with the breakup of the Soviet and Yugoslav states in the early 1990s, the downward
trends have continued (Nils Gleditsch 2008, pp. 693-694).
One indicator has moved persistently in the wrong direction. How many
countries are at war at any given time? Exploiting the Uppsala dataset on armed
conflicts, backdated to 1946 (Nils Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and
Strand 2002) and updated to 2005, Joseph (2008) has noted upward trends in the
annual percentage shares of all countries in the world that are at war, and of all
possible country-days at war, over the postwar period. Nils Gleditsch (2008, p. 694)
has dismissed these observations as statistical artifacts of a trend to coalition wars in
which countries participate symbolically, at increasing distance, without ever
exchanging fire with the adversary. This comforting inference is undermined,
however, by another observation (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008, p. 867):
between the 1950s and the 1990s, the average distance separating country pairs at
war fell by half (from more than 5,000 kilometers to less than 2,500).2
Using a slightly different measure, we trace the origin of the upward trend in the
frequency of bilateral conflicts as far back as 1870. We show that it has proceeded
with surprisingly little interruption through two World Wars nearly to the present
day. Befitting a phenomenon that is older than the oldest person alive today, we
suggest that deep causes are at work.
Figure 1 charts the number of pairs of countries that have disputed with each
other in each year from 1870 to 2001. This is a greater number than the number of
wars for two reasons: first, it accounts for the number of countries involved in each
conflict, rather than the number of conflicts; second, it has wider coverage than
formal states of war, because it includes displays as well as uses of military force.
The chart measures the number of pairwise disputes on a logarithmic scale, partly to
give a clear picture of what has happened at the lower frequencies.
Chart 1. Militarized disputes between pairs of countries since 1870
Source: Data from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
Viewed in this way, the chart demonstrates the existence of a clear log-linear
trend; the frequency of bilateral conflicts has been rising for over a century at a
steady 2¼ percent per year. To be sure, there was a good deal of disturbance around
the two world wars. But the surprising character of this disturbance is as follows:
between 1914 and 1945, the conflicts that would normally have been distributed
across the three decades were either brought forward (to World War I) or
postponed (to World War II). After 1945, the frequency of conflict snapped back to
the trend it had followed up to 1914.
1
1 All tests for unit roots are clearly rejected, whether we test the entire time
series, 1871 to 2001, or only the post-war sample, 1945-2001. A Phillips-Perron (PP)
Unit Root Test in levels with an exogenous constant rejects the null hypothesis of a
unit root at the 1% level, as does a PP Test with a constant and a linear trend. These
results also hold for the post-war sample. We tried other tests such as ADF, KPSS, or

































In principle, the absolute number of pairwise conflicts per time period, or the
absolute frequency, is the product of two underlying variables into which it can
therefore be decomposed. One component is the number of country pairs, which
has increased enormously since the nineteenth century. In 1870 the world contained
fewer than 50 independent states. By the end of the twentieth century, there were
more than 180. This was associated with the breakup of empires (Austro-Hungarian,
German, Ottoman, Russian, French, British, Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese, and Soviet)
and federations (Czechoslovak and Yugoslav). As a result the total number of
possible country pairs in the world between whom relations of peace or war could
exist grew from around one thousand to over 17,000.
After the increase in the number of possible pairs is stripped out of the data, we
are left with the other component, the relative frequency of conflicts, that is, the
absolute frequency of pairwise conflict normalized for the number of pairs. The
number of countries since 1870 and the relative frequency of conflicts among them
are shown together in Chart 2. As the chart shows, in the first 80 years the number
of countries did not change much, but the relative frequency of disputes tended to
rise. Then, over the next 40 or so years, the relative frequency of disputes fell back
to the level of the 1870s, but the number of countries increased dramatically, and it
was this that took over as the main driver of the continued rise in the absolute
frequency of conflicts.
Chart 2. The relative frequency of pairwise militarized disputes and the number of
independent states since 1870
Source: Data from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
This gives us two possible angles on what has been going on. Normalized for the
number of country pairs, the relative frequency of war does not show a trend and is
no higher today than in the 1870s. This might seem to reassure, but should not do
so. For, normalized for the number of planets that all countries must share – that is
one, exactly – the absolute frequency of conflict today is similar to what it was































































the number of pairwise conflicts that is the same.) It is true that the number of
conflicts has been driven up since 1945 by the number of states. But the number of
states is not an exogenous or random variable. When new states come into being,
what motivates them is the demand for sovereignty (Alesina and Spolaore 2003).
And sovereignty includes decisions over peace – and war – with neighbors, including
former compatriots. In fact it is not at all uncommon for new states to plunge into
war, like Serbia, or be born out of war, like Kosovo.
In sum, should we be reassured by the lack of trend in the relative frequency of
conflict, or alarmed by the rising trend in absolute numbers? In our view the trend in
the absolute frequency should arouse concern. It is also a puzzle.
2. Too Frequent?
The data are a surprise, given the longstanding traditions of western political and
philosophical thinking on the future of war. According to these traditions, the global
trends towards democracy and globalization should make war increasingly a
minority sport. In fact, war is a minority sport. The problem is that the minority is
growing.
The expected relationship between war and globalization is, on the face of it,
clear cut. For many reasons, modern states ought to prefer trade to war. On the eve
of World War I, Norman Angell (1910, pp. 76-77) wrote:
Men are fundamentally just as disposed as they were at any time to take wealth
that does not belong to them. But their relative interest in the matter has
changed. In very primitive conditions robbery is a moderately profitable
enterprise ... But to the man whose wealth so largely depends upon his credit,
dishonesty has become as precarious and profitless as honest toil was in more
primitive times.
In more contemporary terms, trade is a positive-sum interaction; war is
negative-sum. Trade costs have fallen (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2008); war costs
are high and rising (Edelstein 2000, pp. 336-350; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; Glick and
Taylor forthcoming). Victory in war can bring one-sided gains but the gains are
reversible if conflict is renewed. And, in wars of choice, victory is not only uncertain
but unlikely. On the record of all wars since 1700, to start one attracts a 60 percent
probability of defeat (Eckhardt 1989).
More or less the same tradition affirms that the spread of democracy should
crowd war out of the global community. It is widely held that “Liberal or democratic
states do not fight each other” (Levy 1988). The reasons for it have been debated.
Plausibly, democratic norms make leaders more likely to exercise self-restraint.
More convincingly, political scientists have pointed to political structures that
impose restraint on democratic leaders; leaders that lose wars, for example, are
found to be more likely to lose office in democracies than in autocracies (Bueno de
Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Autocrats, in contrast, can steal the benefits of war
while shifting the costs onto their subjects (Jackson and Morelli 2007); if defeated,
they can retain supporters’ loyalty at lower cost than in a democracy (Bueno de
Mesquita and Siverson 1995; see also Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and5
Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Bueno de
Mesquita 2006).
A compelling illustration of the so-called democratic peace is shown in Table 1.
Whether the definition of conflict is narrow or broad, democracies have been
systematically less likely to engage in it with each other.
Table 1. Russett on dispute behavior, 1946-1986
War No war Percent with war
Democracy 0 169 0.0
Not Democracy 37 1045 3.4
Use of force No use of force Percent using force
Democracy 8 161 4.7
Not Democracy 229 853 21.2
Any dispute No dispute Percent with dispute
Democracy 12 157 7.1
Not Democracy 257 825 23.8
Note: The unit of analysis is the “regime-dyad.” The unit is counted as a democracy
in all years when both countries in the dyad (or pair) are democratic, and not
otherwise. All years in which the regime of the dyad is unchanged are taken as a
single unit, so as to eliminate any bias arising from persistent pairwise behavior.
Source: Russett (1995, p. 167).
The democratic peace continues to be debated. Some issues, such as the
existence of counter-examples (e.g. Rosato 2003, 2005), are of questionable
significance in themselves because anomalies can be always be interpreted
otherwise than as grounds for refutation: they may reflect randomness, or selection
bias, or the influence of confounding factors (Doyle 2005; Kinsella 2005; Slantchev,
Alexandrova, and Gartzke 2005).
Some qualifications to the democratic peace may matter. Here are three recent
examples. First, Downs and Rocke (1994) have noted that elected leaders that face
punishment by the electorate because their policies are failing have an incentive to
gamble for resurrection, either by starting wars or by persisting with them, in the
hope that something will turn up. This argument has been applied to Iraq by Stiglitz
and Bilmes (2008), as well as generalized by Majumdar and Mukand (2004). Second,
observing the record of the former Soviet and Yugoslav states, Mansfield and Snyder
(1995, 2002, 2005) have proposed that new or incompletely established
democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (for
discussion see Narang and Nelson 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2009). Georgia seems
to have supplied recent out-of-sample confirmation. To similar effect, Doyle (2005)
has suggested that democracy is a dynamic process qualified by values as well as
institutions. The democratic peace rests on a tripod of republican representation,
commitment to human rights, and transnational interdependence that falls when
any one leg is missing. Finally Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2008) have found in
the data that democracies where leaders are subject to term limits are as likely to
make war as autocratic states – and term limits are increasingly widespread. It is the
democracies without term limits, where established leaders retain the option of
continuing to compete for office, that account for the democratic peace.6
In short, the idea that democratization necessarily spreads peace has been
qualified in various ways. Whether taken separately or together, however, the
qualifications do not seem adequate to the task of explaining a trend towards the
rising frequency of war that has persisted for 130 years. The full difficulty that we
face is illustrated in Charts 3 and 4 which deal, respectively, with the spread of
democracy and trade.
Chart 3. Democratization and militarized disputes since 1870
Source: Data from Marshall and Jaggers (2007); Martin , Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
Chart 4. Trade openness and militarized disputes since 1870
Source: Data from Martin , Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
As these charts illustrate, the general tendency has been for trade and
democratization to grow together. From study of the endogenous relationship
between trade and democratization since 1870, López Córdova and Meissner (2008)
confirm that more open countries have been consistently more democratic; most




















































































































and varying channels. But on our own figures, as trade and democracy have spread,
so have wars. Over significant sub-periods, for example from 1870 to 1913 and from
the mid-1970s to 2001, the positive associations of openness and democratization
with the absolute frequency of wars have been particularly close. Thus, if we have
not got the general relationship between economic and political progress and war
completely and utterly wrong, then, to say the least, we have missed some
important confounding factors.
Closer statistical analysis can sharpen our focus on this puzzle. First, the
relationship between militarized disputes on one hand and democracy and trade
openness on the other will emerge as statistically weak – but not negative. Second,
the changing number (and hence size) of states should be a crucial factor in any
explanation for the frequency of wars. Third, the statistics will tell us that the
relationship between these factors and the frequency of militarized disputes is
highly non-linear.
If we simply regress the number of militarized disputes on the degree of trade
openness and on the average degree of democratization (all in logs), and control for
serial correlation (Table 2, column 1), we find a rather weak negative relationship
between openness and war and a completely insignificant relationship between
democracy and war.
Table 2. Democracy, trade openness and the number of countries
Dependent variable: ln(disputes)
Sample: 1872:2001
Newey-West HAC Standard-Errors and Covariance
Specification 1 Specification 2*
RESET test** on
Specification 2
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 1.984 1.475 -5.359 -2.366 0.741 0.572
Ln (openness) -0.856 -1.389 -0.938 -1.892 -0.043 -0.195
Ln (democracy)*** -0.093 -0.188 0.051 0.111 0.019 0.114
Ln (# of countries) … … 1.568 4.577 0.144 0.530
AR (1) 0.883 29.04 0.753 9.277 0.140 0.916
Fitted value
2 … … … … 0.155 5.945
Adjusted R
2 0.743 0.757 0.763
DW-stat 2.264 2.069 2.024
No. of Obs. 130 130 130
Notes:
* An omitted variable test simply tests whether the inclusion of further variables
makes a significant contribution to explain the variation of the dependent variable.
Here, the test suggests that the number of countries should be added to the list of
explanatory variables at a 1% level of significance.
** Ramsey’s (1969) RESET Test Statistics: F-Statistic: 4.251 (Probability: 0.04),
Log likelihood ratio: 4.382 (Probability: 0.036).
*** Democracy is the score of a composite index for democratization, averaged
over all sample countries for a given year, from Marshall and Jaggers (2007),
normalised to 0-10 to avoid negative numbers.
Chart 2 suggested that the absolute frequency of wars may be heavily affected
by the increasing number of countries. An omitted variable test strongly suggests
that we should augment our specification to control for this. The new result shows8
three things (Table 2, column 2): the frequency of war is indeed systematically rising
with the number of countries, and strongly so. Next, after controlling for the fact
that the number of countries has increased dramatically, we find that an increase in
trade openness seems indeed to limit the frequency of war. However, note that an
increase in the number of countries will always tend to increase the level of foreign
trade and hence trade openness, so that this result on openness might be spurious.
Third, in this specification there is still no significant relationship between war and
democracy. Bilateral data on conflict, political regime and trade can obviously
qualify such findings, but there does not seem to be any simple relationship in
aggregate terms.
Finally, an econometric perspective allows us to explore whether the
relationship among variables is sufficiently well approximated as linear with all
explanatory variables entering separately, or more complex than this. Using
Ramsey’s RESET test (Ramsey 1969) on the model in column 2 we can test (Table 2,
column 3) whether any transformation of the set of dependent variables – including
cross-products between them, such as effects of democracy and trade on country
formation – can improve the fit. While the linear specification initially appeared to
fit the data rather well with an adjusted R
2 of 0.76, the RESET test very clearly rejects
this simple model. It points us toward possible interactions between democracy,
trade, and the number of countries as well as potential nonlinearities in their effect
on war over time.
3. Wars and the Number of States
As illustrated by Chart 2 and Table 2, the upward trend in the frequency of wars is
tightly related to the increase in the number of sovereign states. Given the dramatic
change in the number of states since 1870, and especially after the two world wars,
an understanding of this relationship seems to be crucial for any explanation of the
absolute frequency of wars in general, and of the role of democratization and trade
in particular.
Empirical studies on the issue usually treat the changing number of countries as
exogenously given, and either use it as an additional control variable, or focus on the
relative frequency of wars standardized by the number of country-pairs (e.g. Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig 2008). This approach can mislead, however, insofar as the
incidence of warfare has been at the heart of the process of state-formation and
wars have served to create, consolidate or destroy states. We take one lesson from
Tilly (1975, p. 42) who, in the context of the consolidation of the European state
system, proposed that “war made the state and states made war.” Another lesson is
available from Gibler (2007) who suggests that peace and democracy are joint
symptoms of stable borders, not the other way around.
If we limit our attention to the period after 1871, many wars in Europe and
elsewhere began in attempts to revise existing political borders, either as a struggle
for independence from empires – often supported by external powers – or as an
effort to expand existing empires. Tensions within the British Empire (for example
the two Boer Wars) and within the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the
build-up to World War I come to mind as conflicts over the very number and size of9
independent political entities. The increase in the number of states after 1918,
largely due to the partitioning of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, was
not only a direct outcome of World War I; aspirations for the creation of new
independent states lay equally at the origins of the war (e.g. Henig 2002).
Similarly, World War II arose from Nazi Germany’s efforts to build an autarkic
continental empire, beginning with the subjugation and liquidation of independent
states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia (Overy 1987).
After 1945 the larger colonial empires were dismantled in a largely (if not
entirely) peaceful way. Many of the newly independent states were only weakly
integrated by European standards, however. They inherited fragmented populations
and fragile economic structures that were designed for an imperial periphery. In
consequence, many of these states were prone to militarized conflicts over
boundaries, motivated either by ethnic tensions or economic pressures. Comparing
the challenges faced by African states to the European experience of state
formation, for example, Herbst (1990, p. 136) argued: “it should be obvious that the
incentives that African leaders have to incite wars for the purpose of state-making
are significant and may become much stronger in the future.” Against this
background, there is a clear case for treating the number and size of countries as
endogenous to the frequency of wars.
As we argued earlier, the data suggest that changes in the number of states not
only affect the absolute frequency of wars but also interact with the effects of
democratization and trade, and hence most probably affect the relative frequency of
wars. Consider the theoretical framework provided by Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
who have highlighted interactions between the formations of states on the one
hand side and democracy, trade openness, and the development of international
institutions on the other. In a nutshell, they argue, given all countries are composed
of heterogeneous populations, global economic integration should strengthen the
formation of smaller independent states; so should democratization, via tendencies
of further decentralization and eventual separatism. The global spread of democracy
and declining trade costs after 1945, together with the observed increase in the
number of states, seems to lend empirical support to these ideas. But it also
challenges our understanding of the frequency of wars.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p. 221) conclude by conceding that they have not
explored “how a configuration of countries might affect the level of conflict” except
for the impact of an “exogenous” change in the likelihood of international conflict
on state formation. Yet the likelihood of international conflict is clearly not
exogenous; it is what we would like to explain.
4. How Much Do We Really Know?
We know less than we should, apparently. There is a vast and long-standing
international relations literature on war and peace. The literature was once based
on intuitive inference from narratives and comparisons, but has been transformed
over the last thirty years by new data and the application of quantitative methods.
Large-scale open-access cross-country panel datasets have been created that deal
with war and peace, political regimes, and historical macroeconomic and trade10
variables.
2 We should know more than ever before about the correlates of war and
peace. Yet, what do we know?
As might be expected, the literature that has resulted, being voluminous, is of
variable quality. Not all of the data now available have been well used; among
thousands of regressions that have been reported are many with potentially biased
or otherwise dubious estimates, for example because of the neglect of fixed effects
in pooled regressions (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001).
In some ways the present state of the field is reminiscent of the literature on
global economic growth and divergence a decade or more ago. Banerjee (2007) has
described how economists strayed into thinking of global development as a machine
that produced growth using levers labeled “investment,” “education,” and “trade.”
In much the same way, estimation strategies have typically modeled global relations
as a machine with big push-buttons marked “democracy” and “trade.” Economists
have learned, however, that, while the big buttons have some power as statistical
drivers of global development in the aggregate, their power has intrinsic limits. The
buttons become particularly unreliable when applied in the context of any given
country. One likely reason (Rodrik 2007) is that their operation is likely to be at least
partly confounded by unobserved cross-country variation in institutions.
Where next for the study of peace and war? Experience suggests three possible
correctives. One is to look inside the regressors: democracy and trade are complex
phenomena that may have multiple or non-linear effects. An example of work in this
spirit would be the investigation of term limits in democracies by Conconi, Sahuguet,
and Zanardi (2008), but other aspects are also likely to be deserving of closer study.
Collier (2007) has argued that electoral competition may impede effective
governance for development unless accompanied by checks on executive power.
Intuitively, electoral competition without executive restraint might be as damaging
for international relations as it can be for domestic development.
Another desirable corrective is to demand that cross-section results ought to be
reconciled with what time series and narratives tell us. The virtue of cross sections is
that they enlarge the data; but the fact is that we live our lives through time. When
we ask what may happen next year, it is not always helpful to be told what would
happen if Argentina became Britain in a timeless way, since countries (and country
pairs) are likely to be otherwise different in ways that we cannot control. Narratives
of democratization in particular countries, for example, have shed light on the
hypothesis of democratic peace where pooled cross-section studies have failed to
do so or may even have misled. In principle fixed effects should exclude the across-
unit variation from the variation that is exploited for estimation, leaving only the
within-unit variation over time, but it is not always clear what is the unit: the
2 See the Correlates of War project at http://www.correlatesofwar.org, the
Polity IV project at http://www.systemicpeace.org, the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict
Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University,
and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) dataset at http://www.prio.no, the
Penn World Tables at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu, and the national income and
population dataset of Angus Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.11
country or the pair, for example (or even the “regime-pair,” as in Table 1). Under
these circumstances, narratives should provide a further check on robustness.
A third corrective is to rethink the units of analysis themselves. We should not
treat the number of sovereign states and their capacity to wage war as exogenous.
The nature of “state and legal capacity” generally, and its relationship to
propensities for peace and war, are the subject of recent work by Besley and
Persson (2008, 2009). Following their lead, further research in this field should also
incorporate issues of state-formation, institutional change and openness. Such an
agenda faces two obvious challenges. The first challenge is that empirical studies
into these issues must find a way to capture the process of state formation as an
endogenous variable. But the data are intrinsically unsuited to this. The data
currently used in empirical studies are defined on the lines of national state
boundaries (for example data on trade between states, state institutions, or conflicts
between states). The state made statistics, and statistics defined the state (e.g.
Tooze 2001, pp. 1-39). Therefore, we face great difficulty in treating changes in
boundaries – that is, changes in the geographical reach of institutions – as varying
endogenously over time, and this is one factor that tends to limit our focus to
variation in the cross-section.
One solution might use narratives and case studies that explore both
developments over time and interactions between regions. Another solution would
follow Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and McSweeney (2002) and Michalopoulos
(2008) who use data on a grid of equally sized regions that are defined strictly by
geographical position. Their data would require extension to cover institutional
characteristics including political independence, variables reflecting trade costs, and
the prevalence of conflict. This is a feasible but still enormous task.
The second challenge arises directly from our earlier results and the broad
trends visible in the data. An understanding of the frequency of wars apparently
needs to consider not only the relationship of war to state formation, institutional
change, and trade, but should crucially consider all these factors as interrelated. For
example, democratization may impose constraints on political leaders that reduce
the probability of war and enhance trade integration. Simultaneously,
democratization might transform public finance and hence as a by-product increase
the capacity to wage war. Trade integration, by enabling countries to consume
outside their production possibilities, may also increase the capacity for war. Hence,
the second challenge is to open the “black boxes” of institutions, boundaries, and
trade and inspect the multiple interactions through which each affects the
frequency of war.
Put in a simpler way, a focus on the appetite or “demand” for war is reasonable
and justifiable, but may have led us to neglect “supply-side” or capacity-for-war
factors that are also relevant. We will consider aspects of this at greater length,
using two examples: the fiscal capacity for war and what we will term the
“commercial” capacity for war. Globalization and democratization both ought to
have diminished the appetite for war – and may well do so in cross section. But they
may also have promoted the capacity for war over long periods of time, and this
may explain some of what we see in the historical time series.12
5. The Fiscal Capacity for War
In the middle ages citizens were poor. Tax compliance was low and sovereign debt
was unattractive to lenders. Often, rulers raised military forces in kind: local
overlords supplied the king with armed men and food. As a result, the ruler could
wage external war only by consensus. Or the king raised taxes to pay the army;
conditional on having done so, he gained freedom of military action, but he could
raise the taxes in the first place only through the overlords, and this again required
their consent. Nor could rulers borrow to any great extent because, at this stage,
there was no real distinction between public finance and the personal finance of the
king; lenders were reluctant, not knowing if the king would be bound by his word, or
if his debts would die with him.
Comparative historical research of Karaman and Pamuk (2008) on the Ottoman
Empire, reported in Table 3, is suggestive that no sixteenth-century ruler could
extract more than 5 per cent of GNP in central revenues from the territory of the
kingdom. The burden on peasants might well be higher, but much of what could be
levied was dissipated locally in paying off overlords or tax farmers. Only adding to
the size of the kingdom could add to central revenues, but this risked diminishing
returns to the delegation of tax-raising authority across a larger territory.
Table 3. Central tax revenues, per head (number of daily wages of unskilled
construction workers in the capital city)
1550/59 1780/89





Ottoman Empire 2 to 4 2 to 3
Note: We omit figures for Venice from the table (9 in 1550/59 and 13 in 1780/89).
Venice was a special case: a city state, the Singapore of early modern Europe, a
pioneer of commerce and public finance, but not a contender for military hegemony
in a world increasingly dominated by nations.
Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2008).
The seventeenth century saw a fiscal revolution in northwestern Europe.
Afterwards, English and Dutch fiscal ratios climbed to 10 and then 20 percent of
national income. Patrick O’Brien (2005) has charted the progress of this revolution in
England between 1500 and 1800. In the middle of these three centuries fall the
English Civil War of 1642 to 1651 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Before 1642
English revenues were only once, briefly, more than 5 per cent of national income;
after 1688, they were never less than that, and increasingly much more.
What drove the transformation of public finance? The Civil War and the Glorious
Revolution destroyed absolutism and set new restraints on the executive – at least,
the executive was now restrained in everything but the making of war (Açemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson 2005). Abroad, the government aggressively promoted the
Atlantic trade by extending naval power, a policy that won taxpayers’ support and
built tax compliance. At home, credible guarantees against default widened the13
market for sovereign debt. The result was to build public finance (Tilly 1975, 1990;
Ferguson 2001; O’Brien 2005).
Since other regions of Europe and the Near East did not follow, there was fiscal
divergence. As Table 3 showed, at the end of the eighteenth century the fiscal ratio
of the Ottoman Empire remained where it had been. Through the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the fiscal gap widened. In fact, by the era of the two world
wars, the liberal democracies could put half or more of national income into both
world wars. In World War I, Germany exhausted its economy in the attempt to
compete; the agrarian empires of the Ottomans, Romanovs, and Habsburgs
struggled to mobilize their resources at all (Broadberry and Harrison 2005).













Note: * The United States was in World War I for a year and a half compared with
more than four years for the UK, France, and Germany.
Source: Harrison (1998), Broadberry and Harrison (2005).
Later in the century, the non-democracies caught up and eliminated the gap.
The extraordinary fiscal ratios of Nazi Germany, militarist Japan, and the Soviet
Union stand out in Table 4. Behind this lay the fact that, by World War II, dictators of
varying hues had learned to exploit modern repression to match the fiscal capacities
of the capitalist democracies (Harrison 1998). What the dictators could not do,
however, was match their commercial capacities for war.
6. The Commercial Capacity for War
The commercial capacity for war is illustrated by a twentieth-century paradox. Since
the Napoleonic era, European governments have worried about food security.
Britain has relied overwhelmingly on imported calories. Despite this, in two world
wars Britain had little difficulty in feeding its people (Olson 1963). In contrast, those
countries that believed themselves secure were the first to run short of food. In the
last quarter of the nineteenth century Germany’s leaders worked hard to limit their
exposure to international trade and to protect agriculture. In 1914 Russia went to
war congratulating itself on the availability of a large peacetime surplus of
exportable food. Yet it was Russian and German cities that were stalked by hunger
(Offer 1989; Broadberry and Harrison 2005).
It was easier for Britain to feed itself from the other side of the world than for
Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg, or Constantinople to induce farmers thirty miles
distant from the capital to feed their own people. Why was this? Britain had
invested not in agriculture but in something more important: the gains from14
international trade. These were not only direct gains in the Ricardian sense of
returns to specialization, but also indirect gains from the establishment of an
overseas trading network that would robustly survive the disruptions of continental
war. The Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires had inferior
external networks, although Russia was helped by peripheral membership of the
Anglo-French network. But there was more: these countries, with their large
peasant populations, could not maintain the integration of their own domestic
markets under the pressure of wartime mobilization. Unable to trade with the cities
on peacetime terms, their peasant farmers seceded from the war effort, retreating
into subsistence activities, leaving the soldiers and war workers without food.
To varying degrees, these countries had a commercial capacity for war that was
greatly inferior to Britain’s. They thought they were safe; they perceived the British
to be at risk. When war broke out, they expected Britain to starve. Using commerce
rather than agriculture, however, the British fed themselves to standards little short
of peacetime through two world wars. In both world wars, moreover, the Allies were
able to multiply the military value of coalition resources through long-distance
economic cooperation that the Central and Axis Powers could not match.
The lesson of this narrative is straightforward: war and trade are not exclusive.
The same conclusion can be reached in other ways, however. Using panel data from
1950, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) have shown that trade had a double effect
on the relative frequency of pairwise conflict. More bilateral trade reduced this
frequency, but more multilateral trade raised it. Over time both multilateral and
bilateral openness increased on average, but the net effect was positive. For any
country pair separated by less than 1,000 kilometers, globalization from 1970 to
2000 raised the probability of conflict by one fifth (from 3.7 to 4.5 percent). On the
interpretation of Martin and his co-authors, the same forces that widened the scope
of multilateral trade made bilateral war less costly. As long-distance trade costs fell,
open economies could increasingly wage war against some (most likely close by),
while continuing to reap the gains from trade with others (at a distance).
From various angles, therefore, it is possible to identify something that it is
convenient to call the commercial capacity for war; this capacity is increasing in
trade liberalization, and also in the information, communication, transportation, and
transaction technologies that account for much of modern economic growth.
7. Conclusions
The evidence suggests that, normalized by the number of countries in the world, the
risk of war is no higher today than in the 1870s. Normalized by the number of
planets we have to share, however, it is of the same frequency (if not intensity) as
during World War I. There has been a steady upward trend in the number of
bilateral conflicts over 130 years.
The rising trend may turn out to be driven by things we would otherwise
welcome as global improvements. For example, the hunger for national self-
determination has been satisfied in many troubled regions, and this has led to the
formation of new states. The growing number of states is an important explanatory15
factory in the rising frequency of wars, but this does not make the trend a statistical
artifact because the number of states is not exogenous.
In modern times just as much as in the middle ages, new states have been born
amid conflict. The demand for statehood is also a demand for the capacity to engage
in national self-determination by force, and each new state has added a focus for
potential conflict. With the downfall of empires, moreover, democracy has become
more typical – and, with democracy comes improved fiscal capacity. As a result,
countries that adopt democracy are likely to be able to raise taxes or borrow more
in order to promote national adventures without recourse to domestic repression.
With more borders there is more cross-border trade. Beyond this, moreover,
falling trade costs are another modern boon that has allowed many countries to
benefit from specialization and increased economic interdependence. Wider
markets have increased the scope for smaller countries to self-insure against
asymmetric shocks. A moral hazard that we associate with insurance, however, is
that the insured can then engage in risky behavior at lower cost. In the same way,
small states that reduce risks through multilateral exchange may become more
inclined to risky action in bilateral relations.
We could stop here, noting that the news is mixed-to-bad; by implication, there
is nothing much to be done except build defenses against an increasingly dangerous
world. This seems to us to be unduly pessimistic. But more positive action must
await answers to two questions.
Democracy is good, but without nation there is no democracy, and nation-
building is a double-edged process. Similarly, falling trade costs and wider
multilateral exchange are powerful promoters of economic growth and
development, but may also cheapen war. How can we encourage democracy to
spread in ways that don’t offer gains to nation-building adventurists? How can we
lock countries into regional or global trade without freeing their hands for
confrontational foreign adventures? Together, these questions may hold one of the
keys to a peaceful twenty-first century.16
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